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SUMMARY 
Multinational enterprises are often blamed for their non-transparent capital transactions. 
Since the background of such transactions is always left in dark, critical observers sus-
pect that host economies may be at some disadvantage due to capital and income trans-
fers. Obviously, investments that are carried out in emerging economies do produce suf-
ficient levels of profit which can possibly be reduced through covert ways of income 
transfers. But, usually, even the open profit repatriation is also regarded as “unfriendly” 
step taken by multinationals. It is suffice to say that one of the basic market economic 
principles is the right of capital owners to spend their taxed earnings however they 
wish. There could be incentives to promote reinvesting of profits, but a strict regulation 
of profit repatriation would obviously limit the likelihood of undertaking foreign invest-
ments in that particular country.  
The case of hidden profit transfers through transfer pricing may be a separate case. 
This means from the viewpoint of the host countries a punishable case of tax evasion, 
provided that it can be proved. However, in the case of most emerging economies tax 
evasion as rationale for transfer pricing and income transfers should not be taken very 
seriously, since most of these economies provide very generous corporate income tax 
holidays for foreign investors. The level of tax obligations and actual corporate income 
tax payments is very low. Hence, if there are income transfers via transfer pricing, 
even the direction of such manoeuvres is not so obvious. Why not to channel corporate 
incomes of international networks from countries with high profit rates to countries with 
tax holidays? Such an assumption would, however, provide additional argument for 
those observers of more developed countries who criticize FDI from the basis of trans-
ferring jobs to less developed regions, thus contributing to high unemployment in donor 
countries. FDI not only shifts employment, but may even reduce budget revenues due to 
income transfers to “tax heavens”. 
This paper tries to go after this problem. A simple comparison of levels of value 
added in Germany and in Hungary should clear if there were such income transfers 
between the two countries. For in case taxable incomes that were generated in Germany 
were transferred through e.g. transfer pricing to enjoy tax holidays in Hungary, this 
would mean a higher, artificially inflated rate of value added in Hungary. The compari-
son of the two countries’ rate of value added could not prove this hypothesis. On the 
other hand, calculations showed that the bulk of the tax holidays was used by very 
few, very much concentrated manufacturing branches (basically a handful of large mul-
tinational companies). Another interesting result was that Hungarian rates of value 
added were most advantageous in sectors with relatively low foreign penetration and 
definitely little granted tax allowances. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
Hungary made serious efforts to fulfil its 
transition tasks in the 1990s and put the 
real economy on a firm market-economic 
basis. Legislative frames were created, 
freedom of enterprise guaranteed, trade 
capital flows liberalized, the state sector 
largely privatized, and state intervention 
through direct subsidies substantially re-
duced. 
The state largely withdrew as an eco-
nomic actor and this was expressed even 
in the tardy development of an industrial 
policy concept. Such policy and the use 
of state aid were targeted mainly at in-
vestment, especially foreign investment, 
the underlying idea being that investment 
decisions should enjoy general support 
and the task of picking the winners be 
left to the market and its entrepreneurs. 
State aid ‘materialized’ mainly in the 
form of tax holidays, not as direct 
money transfers. Since the conditions for 
these were rather strict (size thresholds, 
sectoral and employment preferences, 
etc.), most of the qualifiers were foreign 
investors, as has always been stressed by 
                                                 
* The study was sponsored by the 5th Framework 
Programme: Changes in Industrial Competitiveness 
as a Factor of Integration: Identifying Challenges 
of the Enlarged Single European Market (Contract 
No.: HPSE-CT-2002-00148). The author would also 
like to thank especially Prof. Dr. Wolf Schafer for 
his important observations and the DAAD for 
sponsoring a study trip to Europa-Kolleg Ham-
burg, where relevant information and data were 
gathered for the analysis, which was supported 
by the regression calculations made by David 
Ellison. 
the National Association of Industrialists 
(e.g. in IPOSZ 2001). 
This ‘aid policy’ seemed to have been 
successful. Large amounts of investment 
poured into the country in the 1990s, 
contributing to a substantial rise in 
manufacturing competitiveness. But the 
indirect government aim of channelling 
investment into high-technology sectors 
was less successful. In some cases, sec-
toral preferences were met by investors 
in a statistical sense, but the activity pur-
sued in Hungary was not at the desired 
high level. By the end of the 1990s, 
Hungary’s attractiveness to capital inves-
tors was waning under the activity struc-
ture enforced and new investments could 
be absorbed only in industries using a 
skilled labour force. The aid policy 
shifted to channelling investments into this 
direction. 
Generous tax incentives were an im-
portant help in channelling investment 
into the country, whose importance as 
tools has been emphasized by several au-
thors (Éltető 1998, Hunya 2000, 
Antalóczy and Sass 2003, and others). 
With corporate income tax (but not other 
types of tax), Hungary became a tax ha-
ven in the 1990s. This may have induced 
some multinationals to channel here not 
only investment, but also profits of 
worldwide operations, in a move to 
minimize global profit-tax payments. 
There is hardly any analytical evidence 
for this, which is why testing the hy-
pothesis is one of the main aims of this 
paper. Although the rules of transfer 
pricing have been described and accepted 
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in several multilateral agreements, there 
is some anecdotal evidence of interna-
tional tax avoidance. If this evidence 
holds true, the ‘state aid’ of Hungarian 
governments may in some cases have 
been effective aid, actually paid by other 
countries, but realized in Hungary. This 
may also have been a reason behind the 
relatively high share of state aid in Hun-
garian GDP, which emerges from interna-
tional statistics. Hungary’s accession to 
the EU in 2004 changed the picture sub-
stantially, however, as it altered the con-
ditions for granting tax incentives for 
investment. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the figures for 
state aid and highlight the importance of 
tax incentives for investment-attraction 
purposes, especially in manufacturing. 
The share of tax holidays in total manu-
facturing aid increased from below 60 
per cent in 1995 to over 75 per cent in 
2000. It then decreased somewhat as the 
government changed its investment-
promotion policy and tightened some 
conditions for investment tax holidays, in 
preparation for joining the EU. 
Rather than examining the government 
dilemma over how effectively tax holidays 
can support industrial and other policy 
goals, this paper concen-
trates on the opposite 
side. It seeks to observe 
the impacts on multina-
tional corporations of 
the tax allowances they 
obtain. It then discusses 
briefly the tax-policy is-
sues entailed and intro-
duces the idea of a per-
formance-based tax pol-
icy. This approach ad-
dresses adequate level of 
taxes (especially corporate in-
come tax) from the angle of 
‘users of state services’. Even if 
governments really compete 
through tax levels (the main 
pillar of the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
argument), this is still only one 
side of the coin, the other be-
ing the level of state services. 
Competing governments and 
states provide a kind of pack-
age deal. Background infra-
Table 2 
State aid for business associations 
(€ million) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total aid, of which: 577.7 765.0 836.8 689.0 800.1 800.5 
∗ Manufacturing 336.1 509.3 523.2 375.9 479.2 442.1 
∗ Transportation 220.9 223.5 290.3 291.3 304.1 276.5 
∗ Coal mining 20.7 32.2 23.3 16.1 12.6 16.2 
Total aid/GDP (%) 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Per capita aid (€) 56.5 75.2 82.6 68.3 80.0 80.0 
Aid per employee (€) 152.7 209.8 226.3 180.9 207.9 N/A 
Aid/central budget 
expenditures (%) 3.28 3.80 4.01 3.26 3.44 N/A 
Source: TVI 2002, p. 12. 
 
Table 1 
State aid for manufacturing firms by aid categories 
(%) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Non-refundable 
subsidy 
34.28 25.05 22.33 12.46 18.36 26.29
Tax allowance 58.76 58.28 72.90 76.21 76.82 71.04
Interest subsidy 1.46 2.87 0.71 1.84 1.41 0 
Equity share 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Interest-free loan 2.86 4.60 3.60 7.58 2.01 0.39
Guarantee 2.64 9.20 0.46 1.90 1.41 2.28
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: TVI 2002, p. 20. 
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structure, legal background, law en-
forcement, all kinds of regulations, etc. 
are government ‘services’, for which taxes 
are collected in compensation. According 
to this approach, tax policy and many 
other policies, institutions and state activi-
ties are special products treated on 
commercial basis. The intention in this 
paper is not to argue for or against that 
approach, but to point out that it may 
well be taken by companies when they 
make their spatial decisions.  
This kind of argument leads easily to 
the conclusion that tax policy and the 
effective rate of corporate income tax 
make up an important business consid-
eration. The financial performance of af-
filiates may depend on this to a large 
extent, and so may  consolidated corpo-
rate financial performance in some cases. 
Tax policy may influence both spatial de-
cisions and actual corporate financial 
manoeuvres. It is important to differenti-
ate between these two levels, which are 
both influenced by tax policies, but at 
different times and in different ways. For 
the ‘race to the bottom’ discussion, the 
two impacts can be formulated as (i) tax 
incentives channelling investment (and so 
workplaces and potential generation of 
future income) from countries with higher 
tax levels to ones with lower tax levels, 
and (ii) tax measures inducing transfers 
of profits from one location to another, 
towards tax havens. The first issue may 
have a longer-term negative impact on 
high-tax countries, but the year-on 
changes in financial flows and profit 
generation may also be harmful, espe-
cially if accompanied by financial market 
speculation. After a brief description of 
the tax-policy debate, the paper tests 
whether the second impact can be meas-
ured, using Hungarian and German cor-
porate balance-sheet data for 1998–2001. 
TAX POLICY AND INVESTMENT 
INCENTIVES: A ‘RACE TO THE 
BOTTOM’? 
This section does not attempt a general 
overview of the subject of effective tax 
incentives. It highlights a specific interpre-
tation of taxes as ‘compensation’ for spe-
cial state services such as various state-
run market economic institutions run by 
the state, state owned infrastructures util-
ized as ‘public goods’ and alike. In this 
interpretation, the state’s right to collect 
taxes does not come solely from its su-
perimposed position above citizens and 
organizations. It is more a right of the 
state to have the users or ‘customers’ of 
state (public) goods pay for the services 
it provides for them. 
In this market-oriented approach, the 
level of taxation depends on two factors: 
the extent to which the services are util-
ized and the quality of those services. 
The ‘price’ of the services also depends 
on the quality of the services provided. 
But if tax collection is viewed from the 
angle of competition for market transac-
tions, it holds an essential place in the 
market system. This raises the question of 
tax allowances and the ‘race to the bot-
tom’ dilemma. If states compete with 
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their ‘services’ and with the ‘price’ for 
them, i. e. with effective tax levels, then 
in an optimal situation, market equilib-
rium will be established. The argument 
described briefly here (after Schäfer 
2004) runs that a market-compatible, 
competitive approach to tax systems also 
encourages a steady improvement in the 
‘services’ and does not necessarily endan-
ger the stability of the state budget. A 
greater danger is posed by the inefficient 
use of public money that results from the 
absence of competitive pressure on states. 
Today’s typical tax systems define most 
taxes as obligatory monetary contributions 
enforced by the state without any direct 
compensation being provided for the tax-
payers. This definition contradicts the ba-
sic economic principle of voluntary ex-
change of goods. Partners in this rela-
tionship are not equal partners in ex-
change. The relationship between state 
and taxpayer is governed by the power 
of the state. This situation also contra-
dicts the principles of constitutional eco-
nomics, where the state is defined as a 
voluntary association of individual citizens 
with the aim of achieving mutual gains. 
Voluntary authorization of the state by 
citizens to provide services for mutual 
benefit places the relationship between 
state and citizen on the same level as the 
relationship between citizens. 
Compulsion can only be applied, how-
ever, if the citizens concerned are unable 
to avoid the compulsion. Increasing 
chances of doing so, under conditions of 
globalization, are provided by voluntary, 
equivalency-based relationships in the area 
of another jurisdiction. Free movement of 
capital and individuals has increased 
worldwide but such freedom is also an 
underlying principle of the Europe 
agreements and strongly supported by the 
organizations of European integration. So 
today’s systemic competition is marked by 
competition from immobile elements of 
spatial locations for internationally mobile 
resources, to complement the two sets 
and so achieve mutual benefits. Elements 
of systemic competition are part of the 
general competition among spatial loca-
tions and influenced by the globalization 
process, which in this respect can be 
seen as a worldwide programme for in-
creasing the exit options open to the pri-
vate sector (Schäfer 2003). 
The tax system lies at the core of in-
ternational systemic competition. Tradi-
tionally, the view taken of the tax system 
is income-oriented: its task is to gather 
the resources required for the state 
budget (Blankart 2002). Revenue and ex-
penditure are seen as separate. The state, 
as a sovereign, superimposed power, de-
clares what state revenue is required and 
distributes the burdens among taxpayers 
through a differentiated tax system. This 
distribution follows neither the optimum 
principle (a trade-off between efficiency 
and fairness) nor the equality principle, 
which in a sense precludes the state from 
being dependent on particular legal obli-
gations (Schäfer 2004). The opposite view 
focuses on the principle of equivalency 
known from constitutional economics to 
be at the heart of the exchange para-
digm. The state receives the funds neces-
sary to provide its services as compensa-
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tion from those who use them. Thus tax-
payers are burdened according to the 
volume of state services they have used. 
Taxes can be regarded as a ‘price’ for 
the state services rendered (Blankart 
2002; Märkt 2003), with due considera-
tion for the equivalency principle. Sys-
temic competition forces the exchange 
paradigm on the tax system because tra-
ditional tax regimes lose efficiency 
through their lack of equivalency and the 
continual increase in the exit options 
from national tax regimes. 
However, states too can try to escape 
the ‘inconvenient’ impacts of increased 
systemic competition. (i) One option is to 
plug exit opportunities for taxpayers. For 
example, states can curb or attach condi-
tions to the free movement of capital. 
Such restrictions can obviously be harm-
ful economically and they run counter to 
many international agreements, including 
the Treaty of Rome, which promote the 
free movement of capital. (ii) A second 
option is to limit the current tax auton-
omy of states and move responsibility for 
this to a higher level, e.g. to the EU level. 
There are strong moves in this direction 
in the EU and in the OECD. The extreme 
would be to shift the authority to levy 
taxes to a world level, which would 
eliminate taxpayers’ exit options alto-
gether. But the process has also induced 
a kind of race to the top in the field of 
regulation. (iii) A third option is to ‘har-
monize’ tax policies on a bilateral basis. 
This, in economic terms, would create 
international cartels of states intent on 
limiting tax competition. There have been 
several EU and OECD documents dealing 
with the harms and dangers of tax com-
petition. The practice most criticized is 
the provision of tax holidays for invest-
ments, especially preferential treatment of 
foreign over domestic investors (Krause-
Junk 2002). 
All three escape strategies by states 
are intended to curb competition among 
tax systems. But this would also end the 
beneficial effects of competition in this 
segment of the economy (Schäfer 2003). 
Furthermore, the escape strategies would 
launch and increase competition over 
regulation. The regulatory termination of 
tax competition would lose efficiency 
again when enforcement possibilities were 
limited at the borders of the cartelized 
states. Schäfer (2004) argues that the 
question in the ‘race to the bottom’ dis-
cussion is put the wrong way. If gov-
ernments scold international corporations 
for avoiding state taxation by various 
means while still using state services, 
where does the real problem lie? Is the 
process of globalization guilty of endan-
gering the efficiency of the traditional tax 
paradigm? Or has the income-based 
principle of the traditional tax system be-
come decreasingly adequate because it 
becomes incompatible with expanding 
globalization? It is not the separate ac-
tions of individual players in the game, 
but rather the inflexible rules of the 
game, which contribute to perceived 
negative effects of globalization. So pro-
ponents of the equivalency principle sug-
gest proper overhaul of tax regimes, in-
stead of the regulatory spiral of unifica-
tion and harmonization proposed by the 
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EU and OECD, which eliminates competi-
tive elements from tax systems. 
The following section looks at one po-
tential negatively perceived side effect of 
tax competition. It does not address the 
problem of investment flows, simply the 
possibility of distorted income flows. Do 
multinational companies try to escape na-
tional taxation using exit (ii): channelling 
corporate profits to tax heavens? (Exit (i) 
is to channel investment and business to 
low-tax locations.) 
COMPARING PROFITS IN GER-
MAN AND HUNGARIAN MANU-
FACTURING 
This analysis aims to discover whether 
multinational manufacturers have used 
Hungary as a tax haven, channelling 
profits there in order to reduce tax obli-
gations in other spatial locations. If so, 
this would mean that reported, taxed 
profits were higher than those actually 
earned in Hungary. 
Let us assume an ideal case in which 
production conditions are internationally 
similar and profit rates more or less the 
same, so that the only factor distinguish-
ing spatial locations is the effective rate 
of corporate tax.1 This gives an incentive 
                                                 
1 This may be a bold assumption, as many fac-
tors can create differences in international profit 
rates, linked mainly with level-of-development fac-
tor endowments and investment risks. When com-
paring Germany and Hungary, the latter’s lower 
level of development would indicate higher profit 
margins, but also higher investment risks. These 
effects, with strong tax incentives for investment, 
to channel as much profit to low tax 
locations as possible – within or maybe 
circumventing the restrictions of interna-
tional treaties on transfer pricing. As a 
result, average profit rates in tax havens 
would go up. Parallel with this, the effec-
tive tax collected in high-tax countries 
would go down back, while realized tax 
revenues in tax havens would remain un-
changed – assuming a 100 per cent tax 
holiday – and the consolidated taxation 
of the multinationals would decrease. 
Companies would have ‘saved’ on taxes. 
The statistics for state aid by Hungary 
show that large amounts in tax allow-
ances were awarded in the second half 
of the 1990s. This ‘aid’ was never actu-
ally paid, as it consisted simply of poten-
tial tax revenue never collected. The sus-
picion is that at least some of this uncol-
lected tax revenue was due for activities 
carried out elsewhere, not in Hungary, 
so that the tax relief was effectively 
granted by other countries, not Hungary. 
If that argument holds, there must have 
been higher profit rates in Hungary than 
in other countries. 
To measure profit-rate differences calls 
for a benchmark country, and Germany 
was chosen. It was assumed that sectoral 
profit rates in Germany were typical of a 
large number of developed industrial 
economies, as there must theoretically be 
a levelling out of profit rates internation-
ally. If similar profit-rate measures are 
calculated for Germany and Hungary, it 
becomes possible to measure the differ-
                                                                           
would suggest higher profit rates in Hungary 
than in Germany. 
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ences. But first it is necessary to examine 
the branches of Hungarian manufacturing 
for differences of profit rates, tax obliga-
tions and tax holidays, and for correla-
tions of these with levels of foreign own-
ership. Table 3 summarizes some impor-
tant figures at NACE 3-digit level for 
Hungarian manufacturing industries. It 
was decided to go into this deeper sec-
toral breakdown because the ultimate ob-
ject of comparison was the effective 
profit rate in the same industrial activities 
(to some extent and in some cases the 
same companies) in two different spatial 
locations.  
Table 3 includes all accessible NACE 3-
digit figures for manufacturing industries 
on total tax bills, effectively utilized tax 
holidays, net tax obligations and level of 
foreign ownership, in the sales revenue of 
those industries. First, the cumulative tax 
relief in 1998–2001 was examined. There 
is indeed some concentration: 67.1 per 
cent of all tax holidays were granted in 
seven industries (Column 3). Oil refining 
(230) got 7.1 per cent (HUF 20.5 billion), 
basic chemicals 5.5 per cent (HUF 15.9 
billion), drugs (244) 8.3 per cent (HUF 
24.1 billion), office machines and com-
puters (300) 8.1 per cent (HUF 23.3 bil-
lion), lighting equipment (315) 6.3 per 
cent (HUF 18.4 billion), road vehicles 
(341) 12.8 per cent (HUF 37.1 billion), 
and automotive parts (343) 19 per cent 
(HUF 54.9 billion). All these industries 
except basic chemicals are dominated by 
foreign companies, with the lowest share 
of multinationals in total turnover of 90, 
5 per cent, in the case of computers and 
lighting equipment. Moreover, all these 
industries (except 343 automotive parts) 
are highly concentrated on a handful of 
large multinationals. An exception may be 
oil refining, where the largest player is 
MOL, an international player, but head-
quartered in Hungary, where its shares 
are publicly traded and the main owners 
are international financial investors, not 
other oil companies. There is close cross-
ownership between MOL and the largest 
companies in basic chemicals. 
It is also clear from the table that the 
industries with the highest tax holidays 
pay the least taxes. Column 5 contains 
figures for the relationship between total 
tax obligation and effective tax payment. 
Industries with the largest tax-holiday to-
tals offset almost all their payment duties. 
So their total tax obligation was almost 
completely ‘saved’ by the corporate in-
come-tax holidays received after their in-
vestments. With automotive parts (343), 
19 per cent of the total tax obligation 
was paid, while road transport vehicles 
(341) paid in less than 2 per cent, light-
ing equipment (315) 9 per cent, and 
computers (300) 11.5 per cent. Only 18 
industries managed to reduce the effec-
tive tax payment rate to less than 50 per 
cent. Of these, only 4 were not domi-
nated by foreign owners, with a foreign 
ownership share of less than 50 per cent. 
The last column is also interesting: 
foreign companies’ share in manufactur-
ing sales revenues. The 45 industries 
where the share was over 50 per cent 
have been highlighted, but there were 
many others with 35–50 per cent pene-
tration. Most of these would also have
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Table 3 
Tax obligation and holidays in Hungarian manufacturing 
 
1998–
2001 
Net tax 
obligation (2) Tax holidays (3) 
Total tax 
obligation (4) 2/4 
Level of foreign 
ownership. %* 
151 5679138 2821608 8500746 0.668075 30.5 
152 12768 1612 14380 0.8879 37.6 
153 3637663 3483399 7121062 0.510832 42.5 
154 1106233 1817599 2923832 0.37835 92.7 
155 3740739 720806 4461545 0.83844 67.8 
156 3994114 1846786 5840900 0.683818 10.8 
157 4073597 1498492 5572089 0.731072 32.9 
158 7057854 1537643 8595497 0.821111 53.4 
159 6977426 4970898 11948324 0.583967 69.4 
160 4355210 4487009 8842219 0.492547 91.4 
171 1746021 292434 2038455 0.856541 56.1 
172 308028 362240 670268 0.459559 43.3 
173 227431 13096 240527 0.945553 66.5 
174 1830493 690987 2521480 0.72596 60.3 
175 1130523 215939 1346462 0.839625 49.8 
176 170083 1253 171336 0.992687 30.9 
177 270981 4054 275035 0.98526 28.0 
181 223388 4732 228120 0.979257 22.0 
182 5679149 3077574 8756723 0.648547 53.6 
183 12293 13443 25736 0.477658 40.7 
191 115246 22896 138142 0.834258 44.1 
192 458499 182962 641461 0.714773 72.5 
193 1673000 535797 2208797 0.757426 66.0 
201 602835 175746 778581 0.774274 25.9 
202 2134357 220335 2354692 0.906427 79.0 
203 1506609 486348 1992957 0.755967 36.6 
204 279214 12934 292148 0.955728 6.8 
205 340771 13673 354444 0.961424 23.5 
211 647340 2283032 2930372 0.220907 51.7 
212 3259149 2867418 6126567 0.53197 61.3 
221 8537272 15540 8552812 0.998183 42.9 
222 6234898 1054793 7289691 0.855303 18.3 
223 274733 42069 316802 0.867207 41.3 
230 12171203 20491382 32662585 0.372634 100.0 
241 7678334 15891942 23570276 0.325763 42.7 
242 862375 24284 886659 0.972612 30.0 
243 1782459 312124 2094583 0.850985 68.2 
244 13945711 24126672 38072383 0.366295 96.9 
245 1547295 1923980 3471275 0.445743 70.0 
246 1171674 218298 1389972 0.842948 29.0 
247 2953 41025 43978 0.067147 99.8 
251 1653168 405374 2058542 0.803077 56.5 
252 12206569 5452145 17658714 0.691249 43.9 
261 1105999 4184299 5290298 0.209062 56.2 
262 3708853 1187967 4896820 0.7574 64.4 
263 48680 211 48891 0.995684 6.9 
264 2167039 1714012 3881051 0.558364 65.7 
265 4465028 469253 4934281 0.904899 89.2 
266 4143111 498119 4641230 0.892675 37.2 
267 53988 3358 57346 0.941443 2.7 
268 978835 550002 1528837 0.640248 47.4 
271 658827 475619 1134446 0.580748 22.4 
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1998–
2001 
Net tax 
obligation (2) Tax holidays (3) 
Total tax 
obligation (4) 2/4 
Level of foreign 
ownership. %* 
272 187692 130182 317874 0.59046 39.4 
273 233103 3268 236371 0.986174 20.2 
274 2008049 1165311 3173360 0.632783 37.0 
275 2123186 1294668 3417854 0.621204 64.8 
281 5897506 717669 6615175 0.891512 22.2 
282 989222 310356 1299578 0.761187 47.8 
283 381060 42048 423108 0.900621 9.3 
284 205772 1744795 1950567 0.105493 76.4 
285 4048543 282451 4330994 0.934784 33.1 
286 1604830 291100 1895930 0.846461 61.1 
287 4166961 842151 5009112 0.831876 49.3 
291 1649597 334649 1984246 0.831347 58.3 
292 6937822 1375797 8313619 0.834513 40.3 
293 828516 861969 1690485 0.490106 59.1 
294 890998 259639 1150637 0.774352 68.3 
295 4568008 300022 4868030 0.938369 22.1 
296 69418 17 69435 0.999755 0.0 
297 2491601 3960496 6452097 0.386169 80.5 
300 3057190 23343014 26400204 0.115802 90.5 
311 1256442 152099 1408541 0.892017 40.0 
312 2196843 177391 2374234 0.925285 62.1 
313 1055274 481356 1536630 0.686746 45.7 
314 515823 176 515999 0.999659 3.2 
315 1798002 18366625 20164627 0.089166 90.5 
316 4936275 6667906 11604181 0.425388 90.4 
321 4171219 2385643 6556862 0.636161 81.2 
322 4761921 4507977 9269898 0.513697 78.5 
323 2629688 7803647 10433335 0.252047 98.1 
331 1809588 443868 2253456 0.803028 9.9 
332 2216777 332048 2548825 0.869725 45.4 
333 1374267 425939 1800206 0.763394 31.9 
334 270669 17183 287852 0.940306 76.9 
335 14309 4 14313 0.999721  
341 661060 37123759 37784819 0.017495 99.8 
342 600805 1069470 1670275 0.359704 49.5 
343 12865091 54875068 67740159 0.189918 99.7 
351 66090 211 66301 0.996818 0.8 
352 590786 46976 637762 0.926342 87.4 
353 320232 60489 380721 0.84112 0.0 
354 83997 2351 86348 0.972773  
355 87631 10943 98574 0.888987 8.5 
361 2352613 418082 2770695 0.849106 91.4 
362 73554 475 74029 0.993584 21.8 
363 12608 82 12690 0.993538 0.0 
364 474189 1318 475507 0.997228 57.9 
365 179513 101676 281189 0.638407 76.9 
366 846096 58903 904999 0.934914 71.4 
* Share in total sales revenue of firms with over 50 per cent foreign ownership. 
Source: CSO and own calculations 
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over 50 per cent foreign control if a 
looser definition of ownership were used 
and firms with over 30 per cent foreign 
ownership were included in the group of 
foreign firms. So the conclusion is that 
the vast majority of Hungarian manufac-
turing is dominated by foreign firms. 
What does this mean from the viewpoint 
of tax holidays? One interpretation could 
be that foreign investors poured into 
Hungary because of the general invest-
ment incentives, and this may be true to 
some extent. But because of the existing 
investment threshold level (which also 
prevented Hungarian investors from 
qualifying), only the largest firms in the 
most concentrated industries could really 
apply for the holidays. That is expressed 
in the very strong concentration of effec-
tive tax holidays shown by the figures. In 
fact, some Hungarian-dominated indus-
tries in the ‘second tier’ of tax-holiday 
recipients, with a subsidy level one mag-
nitude lower than the largest six, still 
gained significant amounts. Many of even 
these ‘second-tier’ industries are foreign 
dominated and only a few have lower 
foreign participation. So it can be as-
sumed that even in these, foreign inves-
tors were the main beneficiaries of the 
tax incentives. 
The correlation between level of for-
eign ownership in NACE 3-digit manufac-
turing industries and relative importance 
of tax holidays enjoyed was confirmed by 
correlation and regression calculations. 
The measures ‘tax holidays relative to 
total tax obligations’ and ‘level of foreign 
ownership’ (percentage share of foreign 
capital in total subscribed capital) showed 
strong correlation (R square = 0.6). The 
panel regression results appear in Annex 
1. The t statistic shows a robust relation-
ship significant at all levels.  
At this point it was decided to narrow 
the sphere of industries observed to those 
receiving over HUF 1 billion in tax subsi-
dies over the 1998–2001 period: the 34 
industries exceeding this represented over 
93 per cent of all tax holiday granted 
(Table 4). Highlighting has been made for 
industries with over 50 per cent foreign 
ownership and those receiving over HUF 
5 billion in tax holiday. All but one high-
subsidy industry were foreign controlled, 
the exception being basic chemicals (42.7 
per cent foreign share of turnover). This 
branch can be added to the oil industry 
(230) as another exception, where the 
largest producer, in excess of 42.7 per 
cent foreign control, was MOL-owned 
TVK. All other major recipients were in 
foreign-controlled industries. 
The figures in Table 4 lead to the 
conclusion that the hypothesis has at least 
not been questioned. The main recipients 
of tax holidays were foreign-dominated 
industries. The sectoral structure of sub-
sidies is highly concentrated (which can 
also be regarded a sign of an efficient 
aid policy) and tax holidays have proba-
bly been highly concentrate on the activi-
ties of a handful of large multinational 
responsible for very high shares of out-
put in those industries. If that is all so, 
it may rightly be asked whether this very 
strong concentration of tax subsidies is 
justified by the amount and size of these 
recipient companies’ activity in Hungary,
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or whether it has simply been inflated 
for tax-avoidance purposes. 
To see if this was so, it was necessary 
to compare profits generated in Hungary 
with those in benchmark Germany. This 
was possible only if actual profits could 
be related to some kind of cost or sales 
figure (investments, assets). Accounting 
procedures are harmonized in EU coun-
tries, but not uniform, and data avail-
ability sets serious barriers to selecting 
Table 4
Selected financial indicators of major recipients  
of corporate tax allowances in Hungarian manufacturing industry 
(over HUF 1 billion over the period 1998–2001 at current prices) 
 
  
Net tax obli-
gation    
(HUF mn)* 
Granted tax 
allowance 
(HUF mn) 
Total tax 
obligation 
(HUF mn)** 
Effective tax 
as percentage 
of total tax 
obligations 
Majority for-
eign firms in 
total sales 
revenue   
(%, 2000) 
151 Meat processing 5679 2821 8500 66.8 30.5 
153 Fruit/vegetable processing 3638 3483 7121 51.1 42.5 
154 Vegetable oil  1106 1818 2923 37.8 92.7 
156 Grain 3994 1847 5841 68.4 10.8 
157 Animal feed 4074 1498 5572 73.1 32.9 
158 Other food 7058 1538 8595 82.1 53.4 
159 Beverages 6977 4971 11948 58.4 69.4 
160 Tobacco 4355 4487 8842 49.3 91.4 
182 Textile garments 5679 3078 8757 64.9 53.6 
211 Paper and pulp 647 2283 2930 22.1 51.7 
212 Paper products 3259 2867 6127 53.2 61.3 
222 Printing 6235 1055 7290 85.5 18.3 
230 Oil refinery and processing 12171 20491 32663 37.3 100.0 
241 Basic chemicals 7678 15892 23570 32.6 42.7 
244 Drugs 13946 24123 38072 36.6 96.9 
245 Household chemicals 1547 1924 3471 44.6 70.0 
252 Plastic products 12207 5452 17659 69.1 43.9 
261 Glass 1106 4184 5290 20.1 56.2 
262 Ceramics 3709 1188 4897 75.7 64.4 
264 Bricks 2167 1714 3881 55.8 65.7 
274 Non-ferrous metal 2008 1165 3173 63.3 37.0 
275 Metal foundries 2123 1295 3418 62.1 64.8 
284 Metal forming 206 1745 1951 10.5 76.4 
292 Other gen. machinery 6938 1376 8314 83.5 40.3 
297 Other household electrics 2492 3960 6452 38.6 80.5 
300 Office m. computers 3057 23343 26400 11.6 90.5 
315 Lighting equipment 1798 18367 20165 8.9 90.5 
316 Other electrical mach. 4936 6668 11604 42.5 90.4 
321 Electronic parts 4171 2386 6557 63.6 81.2 
322 Industrial com. systems 4762 4508 9270 51.4 78.5 
323 Consumer electronics 2630 7804 10433 25.2 98.1 
341 Road vehicles 661 37124 37785 1.7 99.8 
342 Automotive chassis 601 1069 1670 36.0 49.5 
343 Automotive parts 12865 54875 67740 19.0 99.7 
* Book values. ** Total tax obligation minus granted tax allowances. 
Source: Own calculations based on CSO data. 
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adequate profit-rate indicators. Company 
balance-sheet data had to be extracted 
from tax-office records, or for Germany, 
from a statistical office publication (SBA 
2002)  
An attempt was made to widen the 
scope of the comparisons by testing profit 
rates at different levels of the accounts. 
Hypothetically, it would be good to com-
pare profit-and-loss statements on trad-
ing-activity level (sales revenues minus 
direct costs), corporate level (sales and 
other incomes minus direct and indirect 
costs), gross corporate profit before tax, 
and the same after tax. What could be 
obtained in a more or less comparable 
form from the two data sources were 
Gross Production, Net Production Gross 
Value Added (Brutto Wertschöpfung) and 
Net Value Added (Netto Wertschöpfung 
zu Faktorkosten). Since the German publi-
cation used an analytical approach for 
grouping various costs, it was to some 
extent different from the accounting-
focused Hungarian database. For exam-
ple, depreciation was deducted in differ-
ent phase, and indirect taxes and subven-
tions were incorporated at different 
stages. To streamline and harmonize the 
possible measures, data was purchased to 
calculate some of the German measures. 
Finally, two profit-rate measures were 
calculated: gross and net value added, 
each divided by gross turnover. The dif-
ference between gross and net value 
added is by and large indirect taxes and 
subventions, as well as depreciation. An 
important difference from Hungarian sta-
tistics was that the two variables included 
wage costs, which are deducted from 
sales revenue at the level of direct and 
indirect costs in standard Hungarian sta-
tistics. So wage costs were added to the 
Hungarian profit figures to obtain the 
value added data. 
The calculations did not bring the ex-
pected results. Hungarian profit rates 
were not significantly higher than German 
ones, as they should have been to prove 
the hypothesis. On the contrary, German 
profit rates in most industries exceeded 
the Hungarian levels significantly. One 
possibility, therefore, is that German 
profit rates are indeed higher, but an-
other is that various inconsistencies be-
tween the two databases prevented the 
creation of matching German and Hun-
garian measures, so that they tended to 
slew the results in favour of Germany. 
The non-weighted average profit rates 
were 32 per cent for gross and 28 per 
cent for net value added for Germany, 
and 27 and 23 per cent for Hungary. 
The magnitude of the differences also 
draws attention to the fact that German 
wage costs are strikingly higher. As the 
measure includes wage costs, the two 
countries’ measures might level off after 
they were deducted. The distortion of the 
measures would then mean only that 
German manufacturing had higher in-
come-generating potential than Hungarian 
did. After the deduction of wage costs 
would the levels even up or would the 
expected higher share of value added in 
Hungary to compensate for capital and 
tax revenues be obtained after all? In 
that case, the option of deliberate profit 
transfers would still be open. Unfortu-
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nately, adequate German data for wage 
costs was not obtained, so that it was 
not possible to calculate the reduced 
value added measure. The figures for the 
two profit-rate measures appear in Table 
5, broken down to NACE 3-digit level in-
dustries, the ones that received most tax 
subsidies in Hungary. 
Columns D1–H1 and D2–H2 of Table 
5 show the relationship between the pairs 
of profit-rate measures. The bold negative 
values indicate higher Hungarian figures, 
Table 5
Levels of accumulated relative profits* in selected 
manufacturing industries in Germany and Hungary, 1998–2001 
 
  H1 H2 D1 D2 D1-H1 D2-H2 
Majority foreign 
firms in total sales 
revenue (%, 2000)
151 Meat processing 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.04 0.08 30.5 
153 Fruit/vegetable processing 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.17 -0.05 0.02 42.5 
154 Vegetable oil  0.20 0.15 0.10 0.88 -0.10 -0.06 92.7 
156 Grain 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.15 -0.03 -0.02 10.8 
157 Animal feed 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.03 32.9 
158 Other food 0.29 0.19 0.30 0.26 0.01 0.07 53.4 
159 Beverages 0.35 0.20 0.24 0.19 -0.11 -0.01 69.4 
160 Tobacco 0.60 0.51 0.10 0.10 -0.50 -0.42 91.4 
182 Textile garments 0.41 0.34 0.25 0.23 -0.16 -0.11 53.6 
211 Paper and pulp 0.25 0.17 0.30 0.24 0.05 0.07 51.7 
212 Paper products 0.28 0.19 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.08 61.3 
222 Printing 0.31 0.21 0.44 0.38 0.13 0.17 18.3 
230 Oil refinery and processing 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.07 -0.17 -0.11 100.0 
241 Basic chemicals 0.27 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.01 0.05 42.7 
244 Drugs 0.51 0.38 0.33 0.29 -0.18 -0.09 96.9 
245 Household chemicals 0.32 0.19 0.26 0.23 -0.06 0.04 70.0 
252 Plastic products 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.32 0.06 0.11 43.9 
261 Glass 0.41 0.31 0.38 0.33 -0.03 0.01 56.2 
262 Ceramics 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.38 -0.11 -0.06 64.4 
264 Bricks 0.43 0.31 0.43 0.32 0.0 0.01 65.7 
274 Non-ferrous metal 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.23 -0.01 0.05 37.0 
275 Metal foundries 0.32 0.24 0.40 0.35 0.07 0.11 64.8 
284 Metal forming 0.21 0.12 0.42 0.32 0.22 0.19 76.4 
292 Other gen. machinery 0.34 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.03 0.09 40.3 
297 Other household electrics 0.24 0.16 0.30 0.26 0.06 0.10 80.5 
300 Office m. computers 0.19 0.09 0.25 0.34 0.06 0.24 90.5 
315 Lighting equipment 0.36 0.27 0.44 0.40 0.08 0.13 90.5 
316 Other electrical machinery 0.15 0.09 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.19 90.4 
321 Electronic parts 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.21 -0.04 0.01 81.2 
322 Industrial com. systems 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.19 -0.02 0.02 78.5 
323 Consumer electronics 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.18 98.1 
341 Road vehicles 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.04 99.8 
342 Automotive chassis 0.25 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.04 0.05 49.5 
343 Automotive parts 0.22 0.16 0.31 0.27 0.09 0.11 99.7 
* Gross value added/gross turnover (1) and net value added/gross turnover (2). 
Source: Own calculations based on data from CSO and SBA. 
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meaning there were very few industries 
in which Hungary showed higher profit 
rates. In most cases, German measures 
were much higher, often by over 10 per-
centage points. The outstanding measure 
for Hungary’s tobacco industry is the re-
sult of the high excise tax not being de-
ducted from sales. It is also obvious that 
the positive or negative deviations have 
hardly any correlation with the dominant 
ownership pattern of the industry. 
Table 6 
Deviations from average profit levels of selected industries in Hungary and Germany 
(1999–2001 cumulative profit figures) 
 
(1) (2) H1/H1’(3) 
H2/H2’
(4) 
D1/D1’
(5) 
D2/D2’
(6) 
3-5   
(7) 
4-6   
(8) 
Majority for-
eign firms in 
total sales 
revenue    
(%, 2000) 
151 Meat processing 0.50 0.44 0.60 0.62 -0.10 -0.18 30.5 
153 Fruit and vegetable processing 0.70 0.63 0.52 0.58 0.18 0.05 42.5 
154 Vegetable oil  0.64 0.64 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.33 92.7 
156 Grain 0.75 0.77 0.63 0.54 0.12 0.23 10.8 
157 Animal feed 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.59 0.04 0.02 32.9 
158 Other food 0.92 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.01 -0.07 53.4 
159 Beverages 1.13 0.89 0.74 0.67 0.39 0.22 69.4 
160 Tobacco 1.95 2.23 0.32 0.33 1.63 1.90 91.4 
182 Textile garments 1.31 1.49 0.75 0.81 0.56 0.68 53.6 
211 Paper and pulp 0.81 0.76 0.91 0.84 -0.10 -0.08 51.7 
212 Paper products 0.89 0.83 0.96 0.94 -0.07 -0.09 61.3 
222 Printing 1.00 0.92 1.33 1.34 -0.33 -0.42 18.3 
230 Oil refinery and processing 0.84 0.79 0.27 0.23 0.57 0.56 100.0 
241 Basic chemicals 0.86 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.0 0.0 42.7 
244 Drugs 1.64 1.67 1.00 1.01 0.64 0.66 96.9 
245 Household chemicals 1.05 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.24 0.01 70.0 
252 Plastic products 0.96 0.91 1.10 1.11 -0.14 -0.20 43.9 
261 Glass 1.32 1.38 1.16 1.15 0.16 0.23 56.2 
262 Ceramics 1.69 1.92 1.28 1.32 0.41 0.60 64.4 
264 Bricks 1.37 1.37 1.31 1.12 0.06 0.25 65.7 
274 Non-ferrous metal 0.79 0.80 0.71 0.80 0.08 0.0 37.0 
275 Metal foundries 1.04 1.07 1.21 1.24 -0.17 -0.17 64.8 
284 Metal forming 0.67 0.55 1.28 1.12 -0.61 -0.57 76.4 
292 Other gen. machinery 1.09 1.15 1.13 1.22 -0.04 -0.07 40.3 
297 Other household elect 0.77 0.72 0.90 0.93 -0.13 -0.21 80.5 
300 Office m. computers 0.60 0.42 0.76 1.18 -0.16 -0.76 90.5 
315 Lighting equipment 1.16 1.20 1.34 1.42 -0.18 -0.22 90.5 
316 Other electrical machinery 0.49 0.41 0.99 1.01 -0.50 -0.60 90.4 
321 Electronic parts 1.01 0.89 0.82 0.74 0.19 0.15 81.2 
322 Industrial communications systems 0.76 0.76 0.66 0.67 0.10 0.09 78.5 
323 Consumer electronics 0.28 0.24 0.77 0.81 -0.49 -0.57 98.1 
341 Road vehicles 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.59 -0.04 -0.01 99.8 
342 Automotive chassis 0.80 0.89 0.88 0.90 -0.08 -0.01 49.5 
343 Automotive parts 0.70 0.72 0.95 0.95 -0.25 -0.23 99.7 
Source: Own calculations based on data from CSO and SBA. 
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  In a last attempt to prove the hypothe-
sis, deviations from average profit rates 
in manufacturing were calculated. For if 
there were a problem with differing con-
tent of measures, as seemed to be the 
case, this could be overcome only by ad-
justing the figures. Instead of comparing 
the two countries’ (properly or poorly 
calculated) profit-rate figures, it was also 
possible to compare deviation in each 
branch from the country’s manufacturing 
average. National differences were consid-
ered when introducing the averages and 
examining such deviation. The hypothesis 
would then indicate that in Hungarian 
industries where most tax holidays were 
granted to foreign firms, the profit rate 
deviated from the average in a positive 
direction and at higher magnitude than it 
did in Germany. Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 6 show branch deviation from total 
average manufacturing in Hungary and 
Columns 5 and 6 the same data for 
Germany. Figures over 1 indicate above-
average profit rates. 
Not surprisingly, the greatest deviation 
in Hungary’s case is with the tobacco 
industry, because of the excise-tax prob-
lem, but beverages come in the same 
category. The other industries that made 
above-average profits were rather mixed: 
textile garments, drugs, household chemi-
cals, glassware products, ceramic prod-
ucts, bricks, metal foundries, general ma-
chinery, lighting equipments, and elec-
tronic parts. Yet of the six industries re-
ceiving the highest amounts of subsidy, 
only two (drugs and lighting equipments) 
proved to have above-average profit 
rates. 
Nevertheless, difference from the na-
tional average is not the only factor that 
matters in an international comparison. 
Much more important is the relationship 
between the two countries’ matching 
pairs of indicators. For there may be ra-
tional reasons for investing in low-profit 
Hungarian industries if the rate is even 
lower than in Germany. Furthermore, the 
important point for profit potential will 
be an upward trend in Hungarian profit 
rates. In other words, an industry with 
below-average profit rates may have 
promising potential profit transfers if the 
profit rate of the branch in Hungary is 
closer to its manufacturing average than 
the German figure is. Where there are 
above-average profit rates, the Hungarian 
figures must exceed the Hungarian 
manufacturing average to a greater ex-
tent than is the case with the German 
figures. 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 show the 
results of such a comparison. Bold fig-
ures show industries where German in-
dustries proved to have more advanta-
geous positions. Of the six industries that 
received the highest level of nominal cor-
porate income-tax subsidy, automotive 
parts, road vehicles, lighting equipment, 
and office machinery with computers had 
more advantageous profit-rate positions in 
Germany than in Hungary. Only drugs 
and oil refinery showed advantages in 
Hungary, and it has been seen that the 
oil industry is a special case anyway. So 
the original hypothesis was confirmed 
only for drugs, but even there the rela-
tionship was identified only by secondary 
tools of analysis.  
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It is interesting to see, however, which 
industries proved to have a relative prof-
itability advantage, in Germany and in 
Hungary. Electronics and automotive, the 
two most internationalized industries, 
proved to have a profitability advantage 
in Germany rather than Hungary. The 
same applies to some resource-based in-
dustries, like the metal industry and pa-
per and pulp. Hungary, on the other 
hand, seems to enjoy a profitability ad-
vantage in the food industry, the chemi-
cal industry and construction materials 
(all low-tech industries), and in some sec-
tions of the electronics industry. These 
results are in line with the traditional 
specialization patterns and the develop-
ment levels of the two countries. 
SUMMARIZING CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to check whether 
tax incentives provided by the Hungarian 
state have induced measurable profit 
transfers by multinational companies from 
spatial locations other than Hungary. The 
existence of such transfers may be very 
relevant to a discussion of tax policy and 
the ‘race to the bottom’ argument, as it 
would indicate that ‘unfair’ tax measures 
not only divert multinational investment 
from developed countries, but generate 
measurable profit transfers for tax-
avoidance purposes, from these countries 
to low-tax locations and tax havens. This 
may be the case even though some 
profit-transfer measures (e.g. transfer 
pricing) are internationally regulated. 
Analysis of the profit rates of Hungar-
ian manufacturing industries seemed es-
pecially relevant, as tax holidays in this 
country have been strongly concentrated 
on a few industries and companies. So 
the ‘temptation’ to channel corporate in-
come to Hungary seemed rather high and 
large numbers of profit figures appeared 
to be unrealistically high. (The tax holi-
days received did not seem to justify 
these industries’ financial performance 
figures.) The paper compared the gross 
and net value added of Hungarian and 
German NACE 3-digit level industries, to 
see if the profit rates of industries receiv-
ing the biggest tax holidays showed a 
clear profit-rate advantage for Hungary 
(a sign of artificially inflated profits). 
The analysis did not reveal evidence 
for the hypothesis. The general level of 
profits was higher in Germany than in 
Hungary, and the relatively more profit-
able industries in Hungary were far from 
identical with the ones that received the 
biggest tax subsidies. Based on these re-
sults, although rather limited analytical 
tools were used, the original hypothesis 
can be rejected. No proof was found that 
multinational companies’ were misusing 
certain countries’ tax incentives for the 
purpose of tax avoidance. The question 
may be reopened, however, if comparable 
data becomes available for calculating 
identical and comparable measures of 
profit rates. The picture could alter espe-
cially if wage costs could be filtered out 
of profit measures. In the tax-policy dis-
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cussion, the survey did not draw any 
conclusions about the efficiency or im-
pacts of tax incentives for investment, 
which is the prime objective of the ‘race 
to the bottom’ argument.  
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ANNEX: SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,60963086 
R Square 0,371649785 
Adjusted R Square 0,365171948 
Standard Error 0,206525425 
Observations 99 
 
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 2,447095402 2,447095402 57,37251031 2,12825E-11 
Residual 97 4,137316855 0,042652751   
Total 98 6,584412257    
 
 Intercept X Variable 1 
Coefficients 0,011488 0,556273 
Standard Error 0,041715 0,073441 
t Stat 0,275391 7,574464 
P-value 0,783601 2,13E-11 
Lower 95% -0,07131 0,410513 
Upper 95% 0,094281 0,702032 
Lower 95.0% -0,07131 0,410513 
Upper 95.0% 0,094281 0,702032 
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